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The Commons Concept and Intellectual Property Rights 
Regime: Whither Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge?  
CHIKA B. ONWUEKWE∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The classification of plant genetic resources (PGRs)1 as the common 
heritage of humankind2 continues to generate controversies.3  The debate is 
between developing countries that are the primary sources of these re-
sources and industrialized, biotechnologically advanced countries that ap-
propriate and utilize PGRs as raw materials for various commercial prod-
ucts, such as medicine, seed variety, or pesticides.4  Scholars of diverse 
  
 ∗. Ph.D Candidate and Genome Prairie (Canada) Doctoral Fellow, Department of Interdisciplinary 
Graduate Studies, University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Canada.  I wish to thank Dr. Michael Mehta, 
Dr. Grant Isaac, Dr. Peter W.B. Phillips, Dr. Michael Gertler, and Professor Martin Phillipson for their 
comments on the initial piece that gave rise to this article.  I also appreciate the assistance of the edito-
rial staff of Pierce Law Review, especially Jon Wise, Shawn Gorman and Nicole Hough.  I am most 
grateful to Genome Prairie, Canada for funding this research.  Any errors are entirely mine and not 
attributable to any other person or entity.  
 1. In this article, the phrase “plant genetic resources” is used interchangeably with “germplasm,” 
and occasionally, “plant plasm,” “landraces,” or “local cultivars.”  To a large extent, they mean the 
same thing.  They also best describe the resources or actual materials at issue in the struggle for control 
of traditional cultivars or indigenous knowledge on the uses of germplasm.  PGRs are defined to in-
clude microscopic cell samples to grow trees.  In other words, anything that contributes to the devel-
opment of new or improved plant varieties would be classified as PGRs.  On the other hand, germplasm 
refers to the “genetic material encoded not only in seeds but in rootstocks and plant tissue of all kinds. . 
. .”  J. Tevere MacFadyen, A Battle Over Seeds: The Third World Asks for a Share of Gene Stocks Bred 
in Northern Laboratories - from Southern Seed 256 The Atlantic 36, 38 (Nov. 1985). 
 2. In this article, “humankind,” “mankind,” and “humanity” are used interchangeably.   They mean 
the same thing in our analysis of the “common heritage” concept.  
 3. Even amongst the Crucible Group, a private initiative’s think-tank focusing on indigenous 
knowledge issues, plant biotechnology and intellectual property rights, there is no agreement on the 
modalities for resolving PGR controversy.  They have found a way, however, to include dissenting 
opinions in their publications.  See generally Seedling Solutions: Options for National Laws Governing 
Control over Genetic Resources and Biological Innovations 2 (Crucible II, ed., Intl. Dev. Research Ctr. 
& Intl. Plant Genetic Resources Inst. 2001).  
 4. See generally Robin Pistorius & Jeroen van Wijk, The Exploitation of Plant Genetic Informa-
tion: Political Strategies in Crop Development (CABI 1999).  Furthermore, Stenson and Gray assert, 
“Traditionally, unmodified germplasm had been regarded as the ‘common heritage of mankind’; the 
rise of intellectual property rights in modified germplasm, however, has led the developing world to 
reassess this situation.  This reassessment has in turn led to a fundamental change in the status quo 
concerning genetic resources.”  Anthony J. Stenson & Tim S. Gray, The Politics of Genetic Resource 
Control 9 (Macmillan Press Ltd. 1999).  
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backgrounds5 express various opinions on whether PGRs obtained from 
plants found within a territory of a sovereign state should properly be des-
ignated “common heritage of humankind” or regarded as part of the 
“commons,” and therefore freely accessible.  The debate also extends to 
and challenges the status of traditional knowledge on the uses of PGRs.  
The dominant but not necessarily the correct view is that such knowledge 
is information in the public domain, incapable of private ownership or con-
trol.   
The above contentions are based on the general concept of the com-
mons property system.  Under this system, neither PGRs nor the indige-
nous knowledge on their uses qualify for private ownership;6 rather, PGRs 
and the traditional knowledge on their uses are mere “public goods,” freely 
accessible for the benefit of humankind.  Consequently, the source com-
munities or states, and the holders of traditional knowledge relating to the 
uses of PGRs do not have any prior claims to them or proprietary interests 
in them.7  Similarly, even when PGRs are improved or modified through 
genetic engineering technologies that utilize existing traditional knowledge 
no compensation accrues to source communities or states.   
The denial of property rights (mainly comprised of ownership and con-
trol) over germplasm to source communities or states discountenances the 
past and ongoing intellectual input8 of local farmers on seed improvement 
and conservation.9  This development has far-reaching economic, legal, 
and social consequences on these societies.10  For instance, there is no rec-
ognition of cultural differences between developing countries and the tech-
nologically-advanced countries of the West.  Traditional societies should 
be acknowledged and rewarded for their versatile knowledge on plant uses 
and for being sources and custodians of the rich food and medicinal plants 
that have become valuable in modern biotechnology development.  For this 
reason, indigenous people and developing countries argue that the current 
IPRs (Intellectual Property Rights), regime endorsed by the Agreement on 
  
 5. Particularly those specializing in international law, international trade, international political 
economy, social institutions, anthropology and economics.  
 6. See Stenson & Gray, supra n. 4, at 137.  
 7. For a detailed analysis of the nature and scope of the bundle of legal rights in property, see 
Kevin Gray, Property in Thin Air, 50 Cambridge L. J. 252 (1991). 
 8. This intellectual input of local farmers differs from Western scientific methods. 
 9. See Jack Ralph Kloppenburg, Jr., First the Seed: The political economy of plant biotechnology, 
1492-2000, (Cambridge U. Press 1988) [hereinafter Kloppenburg-First the Seed]; see also Ikechi C. 
Mgbeoji, Patents and Plants: Rethinking the Role of International Law in Relation to the Appropria-
tion of Traditional Knowledge of the Uses of Plants (TKUP Nov. 2001) (a dissertation submitted for 
the Degree of Doctor in the Science of Law, Dalhousie University Halifax, November 2001. Copy on 
file with author.) [hereinafter Mgbeoji-Patents and Plants]. 
 10. See generally Lawrence Busch et al., Plants, Power, and Profit: Social Economic and Ethical 
Consequences of the New Biotechnologies (Blackwell 1991). 
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Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights11 (TRIPs Agree-
ment) cannot shield traditional “know how” from unrecompensed exploita-
tion.   
Knowledge is the primary factor on which patent protection of modern 
biotechnology is anchored.  Not all knowledge in the biotechnology indus-
try, however, qualifies for patent protection.  In Canada, for example, to 
qualify for protection, the knowledge must, in addition to meeting two 
other criteria, be commercially viable.12  It is often argued that this re-
quirement of commercial viability (what economists refer to as utility dic-
tated by the market) distinguishes modern, technical, or scientific usable13 
knowledge from traditional knowledge.14  Under this assumption, knowl-
edge, for IPR purposes, is not wanted for its intrinsic, communal, or social 
value but for its commercial worth.  Economists also contend that because 
of the communal claims to traditional knowledge or PGRs it is difficult to 
isolate individual interests for compensation.  Ironically, those who freely 
appropriate PGRs define PGRs and the traditional knowledge on their uses 
as the common heritage of humankind.  Items of this nature do not qualify 
for patent protection under the current IPR regime.15   
  
 11. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, (Apr. 15, 1994), 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2004).  
 12. Cf. Commr. of Patents v. Pres. and Fellows of Harvard College, SCC 76 (2002).  This recent 
decision in the Supreme Court of Canada, popularly known as the Harvard Oncomouse, dealt specifi-
cally with the patentability or otherwise higher life forms within the meaning of “invention” in section 
2 of the Canadian Patent Act, 1985.  The judgment (see paragraphs 178 and 185) suggests that although 
commercial viability is one of the criteria for granting patents it is not an overriding consideration, 
especially on sensitive issues such as life forms, which eventually reflects a country’s morality and 
values.   
 13. Based on the contemporary definition of knowledge as know-why, know-what, know-how and 
know-who, it follows that IPRs would only be granted if and when know-why, know-what and know-
how are properly combined.  See The Biotechnology Revolution in Global Agriculture: Innovation, 
Invention and Investment in the Canola Industry 25–26 (Peter W.B. Phillips & George G. Khachatouri-
ans eds., CABI 2001) [hereinafter Biotechnology Revolution].   This is why scientific theorems are not 
patentable.  If it were otherwise, renowned scientists such as Einstein would have made huge money 
from patents.  Morck and Yeung put it succinctly when they said: “We therefore rightly associate 
innovation with scientific, economic, and social progress.”  Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, The 
Economic Determinants of Innovation, 25 Indus. Canada Research Publications Program 1 (Jan. 2001). 
 14. See World Intell. Prop. Org., Matters Concerning Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, 
Traditional Knowledge and Folklore WO/GA/26/6 (Aug. 25 2000); Susan Young, The Patentability of 
Maori Traditional Medicine and the Morality Exclusion in the Patents Act 1953, 32 VUWLR 255 
(2001); Vandana Shiva et al., Biodiversity: Social and Ecological Perspectives 43 (Zed Books Ltd. 
1991); see also G. Utkarsh & S. Dasgupta, Protecting People’s Knowledge in the Emerging Regime of 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) http://nlsenlaw.org:8080/csi/biodiversity/articles/bioart5 (accessed 
Feb 25. 2004). 
 15. Cf. R. E. Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights, Access to Plant Germplasm, and Crop Produc-
tion Scenerios in 2020, 39 Crop Science 1630 (1999).  In this article, Evenson provides an illuminating 
account of how IPRs were extended to plant breeding activities in the United States through legislation 
(Plant Variety Protection Act, 1970) and the establishment of international institutions, such as the 
International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV). 
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Because of the commercial value attributed to usable or patentable 
knowledge, economists argue that patents are an incentive for cutting-edge 
industries to invest huge sums of money on research and development 
(R&D).  They also contend that patentability ensures competitiveness of 
companies.16  For economists, therefore, marketable innovation has both a 
personal and a public attribute.  On the personal side, marketable innova-
tion assists industries in remaining competitive in addition to increasing 
their profit margin.  On the public side, it provides consumers alternatives 
that could result in lower prices relative to other competing products or 
services.17   
The disclosure requirement of the patent laws moderates the monopoly 
or exclusivity of use enjoyed by patent holders.18  Even at that, the monop-
oly or exclusivity of use granted to patent holders expires after a limited 
period of time.  Upon expiration of that period, imitators may utilize such 
knowledge or technology without any obligation to the patent holder.  Prior 
to the patent’s expiration, the patent holder could, for a fee or royalty, grant 
third parties access to the process or product.  This grant of access is usu-
ally achieved through a license agreement.  In addition to the criterion of 
commercial utility, a product or process must also be novel and non-
obvious to qualify for patent protection.19  The lack of these three criteria 
has been the basis for the non-extension of patent protection to PGRs and 
the traditional knowledge thereof. 
Against this backdrop this article discusses the concept of the “com-
mons” and its application to PGRs, or what is often referred to as land-
races.  The article adopts an interdisciplinary approach, making substantial 
references to agricultural, political, economic, anthropologic, sociologic, 
and legal literature due to the seamless connectivity of the arguments for or 
  
 16. See Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development: An Inquiry into Profits, 
Capital, Credit, Interest, and Business Cycle (Redvers Opie trans., Harvard U. Press 1934) (cited in 
Morck & Yeung, supra n. 13). 
 17. See Peter W. B. Phillips, The Theory of the Gains from Research (cited in Biotechnology Revo-
lution, supra n. 13, at 273-276). 
 18. Robert E. Evenson, Economics of Intellectual Property Rights for Agricultural Technology (NC-
208 meeting at CIMMYT Mar. 1998) (cited in Agriculture and Intellectual Property Rights: Economic, 
Institutional and Implementation Issues in Biotechnology 91, 98 (V. Santaniello et al., eds., CABI  
2000). 
 19. This is the essence of Article 27.1 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement) with respect to products or processes that qualify for patent protec-
tion.  Under the TRIPs Agreement, plant varieties (but not raw germplasm) qualify for patent protec-
tion.  In fact, Article 27.3(b) directs for a sui generis protection of plant varieties from countries that do 
not offer IPRs protection to such property.   Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights art. 27 (April 15, 1994), http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm (ac-
cessed Feb. 25, 2004);   see also Peter W. B. Phillips & Grant E. Isaac, Regulating International Trade 
in Knowledge-based Products (cited in Biotechnology Revolution, supra n. 13, at 259).  
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against extending the commons paradigm to germplasm or to the tradi-
tional knowledge on the uses of germplasm.   
For clarity, this article distinguishes between the concept of the “com-
mons” and closely related terms often confused with it such as “open ac-
cess,” “common property,” “shared resources,” and “communal resources” 
or “communal property.”  This article argues that PGRs are not within the 
category of commons recognized under international law or any other 
known jurisprudence.  It further contends that equating the “air” or “outer 
space” with “plant plasm” is a misnomer because such an approach un-
dermines the concept of sovereign control of natural resources (renewable 
and non-renewable) within a country’s territory.  Consequently, this article 
questions the justification for applying IPR protection as both a sword as 
well as a shield in the politics of genetic resource control.20   
Lastly, this article argues that classifying germplasms and the tradi-
tional knowledge on their  uses as part of the commons advances the capi-
talist ideology, which Wallerstein defines as the endless accumulation of 
capital,21 notwithstanding the contents of paragraph nineteen of the Minis-
terial Declaration of the World Trade Organization (WTO) made at Doha, 
Qatar in late 2001.22   To contend otherwise would amount to ignorance of 
the economic interests that supports and nurtures the current regime of 
  
 20. The controversy over PGRs is both one of control as well as ownership.  A relationship exists 
between the two notwithstanding that an entity may posses one but not the other.  In the case of PGRs, 
the source countries are denied both.  Fowler put the issues in context when he argued: “With modern 
plant breeding, firms gain the ability to fashion new plant varieties of economic importance.  Farmers 
or Third World governments may own the same plant materials or have all the genes necessary for 
creating a new, improved plant variety in their hands.  But without the ability to fashion the new vari-
ety, their control over their biological material is limited; and without the ability to market new varie-
ties, the usefulness of that control is circumscribed . . . .  Those who do have control do not actually 
have to own the plant species they now use as raw material.  They simply need access to the properties 
of the plants (through the genetic materials). Ownership specifies certain relationships.  But it does not 
strictly determine how or whether those relationships can be used to increase power, make gains, or 
further goals.  In other words, ownership can be a sterile and [virtually] powerless attribute without 
the ability to exploit it.  Such is the case of the Third World farmer and the risk of the Third World 
nation.” Cary Fowler, Unnatural Selection: Technology, Politics, and Plant Evolution 230-231 
(Gordon & Breach 1994) (emphasis added).  Fowler appears to miss the vital point on the legal bundle 
of ownership.  Thus, although ownership may not necessarily connote utilization, but it definitely 
connotes some form of control.  Under this circumstances, an owner may only relinquish control 
through proper assignment, sale or by the doctrine of laches and acquiescence.  After all, possession, 
rather than ownership is nine-tenth of the law.  The position is different with PGRs.  The peculiar 
problem here, as this article argues, is the skewing of international institutions on germplasm in favor 
of the industrialized countries.  For a detailed discussion on possessory rights in property, see David 
Kenneth Irving, Should the Law Recognise the Acquisition of Title by Adverse Possession?, 2 Austra-
lian Prop. L. J. 112, 112-119 (1994); see also Mabo v. State of Queensland, 175 CLR 1 (1992) (distin-
guishing ownership from occupation); Gray, supra n. 7.   
 21. Immanuel Wallerstein, The End of the World As We Know It: Social Science for the Twenty-
First Century 57-58 (U. of Minn. Press 1999).  
 22. Paragraph nineteen instructed the Council for TRIPs to examine the relationship between TRIPs 
and the protection of traditional knowledge. 
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patents.  The best compromise that the West may be willing to offer would 
be a new form of proprietary interest for traditional knowledge neither 
equal to patents nor greater than what plant breeders enjoy under the Inter-
national Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV).23  After all, as Marx rightly commented, property is an instru-
ment of the powerful.24  The unwinding nature of the ongoing multilateral 
trade negotiations together with the inconclusive recent (September 2003) 
WTO summit in Cancun, Mexico supports this contention. 
II.  THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE COMMONS 
The word “commons” in relation to property primarily refers to assets, 
resources, or things owned by nobody but available for use by all without 
restriction.  Due to their peculiar characteristics, such assets, resources, or 
things are both non-excludable and non-rivalry.  Non-excludable means 
that excluding others from using such properties would be expensive and 
almost impossible.  Non-rivalry means that one person’s use does not di-
minish another’s use or access to them.25  Properties of this nature are 
mainly public goods available for the benefit of humanity;26 therefore, the 
outer space, the air, or the resources in the deep ocean seabed are classified 
as part of the commons.   
“Communal” property or resource, however, differs from “commons” 
property or resource.  Unlike the latter, the former simply refers to property 
or resource jointly owned by a community.  For instance, until recently, 
land was held through communal ownership in most agrarian communi-
ties.27  Similarly, traditional societies had joint ownership interests on land 
related resources, such as the village square, economic trees, and sacred or 
  
 23. International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (October 23, 1978), 
http://www.upov.int/en/publications/conventions/1978/pdf/act1978.pdf  (accessed Feb. 25, 2004) (The 
United States has not ratified the March 19, 1991 revision of the UPOV.). 
 24. See generally Maureen Cain & Alan Hunt, Marx and Engels on Law (Academic Press 1979). 
 25. See Shubha Ghosh, Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on 
Patent Rights, 53 Florida Law Review 790, at 797-780 (2001);  See also Stéphane Lemarié, Comparing 
Allocation of Resources in Public and Private Research in Santaniello et al., supra n. 18, 155, 175;  
Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 Arizona Law Review 372 
(2003); John Vogler, The Global Commons: Environmental and Technological Governance, 4-5 (2d 
ed., John Wiley & Sons Ltd, 2000). 
 26. See Gray, supra n. 7.  
 27. See Dr. A. A. Utuama, Customary Law and Land Use Act, 1978 (reprinted in Towards a Re-
statement of Nigerian Customary Law 102-128 (Yemi Osinbajo & Awa U. Kalu eds., Fed. Ministry of 
Just. 1991)); see also Deborah Fahy Bryceson, African Peasants’ Centrality and Marginality: Rural 
Labour Transformations (reprinted in Disappearing Peasantries? Rural Labour in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America 37 (Deborah Bryceson, Cristobal Kay & Jos Mooij eds., Intermediate Tech. Publications 
2000)). 
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spiritual plants.  These resources were for each society’s mutual use and 
benefit.  None of the co-owners could unilaterally exploit for personal use 
the communal property without the consent of the others.  In other words, 
the idea of exclusivity of use did not ipso facto arise.  Societies usually 
parceled-out such communal property amongst the communal owners for 
private use for a certain period.  Land, for instance, was usually parcelled 
out during the planting seasons for cultivation.  To ensure accountability 
and equitable access, the communal owners often entrusted the manage-
ment of the communal resources to a community chief, elder, or any other 
recognized authority amongst them.  Summarizing this system of property 
ownership, Posey and Dutfield stated: 
Communal property is the prevailing system used in most tradi-
tional societies to control access to basic resources like food and 
fuel, but rights are multiple in that individuals, elders, women, 
clans, lineages, etc., each have ownership rights within a given re-
source area and over specified resources within them.  Such rights 
may vary in their extent from one group to another, but they are 
inalienable (others cannot take away or undermine them).28 
In international law, “commons” or “common property” is synony-
mous with areas or resources beyond state jurisdictions or territorial 
boundaries.  The high seas, the superjacent airspace, the living resources29 
thereof, and the moon, belong to this category of resources.30  They are 
collectively referred to as the global commons.  They are also regulated by 
international treaties.31  They are available for “legitimate and reasonable 
use by all states, and may not be appropriated to the exclusive sovereignty 
  
 28. Darrel A. Posey & Graham Dutfield, Beyond Intellectual Property: Toward Traditional Re-
source Rights for Indigenous Peoples and Local Communities 60 (IDRC 1996) (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, in the celebrated Nigerian case, Amodu Tijani v. The Secretary, Southern Nigeria, 2 A.C. 
399, 404-405 (1921), Lord Haldane held,  “[I]n every case the Chief or Headman of the community or 
village, or head of the family, has charge of the land, and in loose mode of speech is sometimes called 
the owner.  He is to some extent in the position of a trustee, and as such holds the land for the use of the 
community or family.  He has control of it, and any member who wants a piece of it to cultivate or 
build a house upon, goes to him for it.” 
 29. See Moore, Behring Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, 1  Intl. Arbitrat. Awards 755 (1898), (cited in 
P.W. Birnie & A.E. Boyle, International Law and the Environment 141 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 
2002)). 
 30. Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29 at 141. 
 31. See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea pt. XI (Dec. 10, 1982) 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (accessed Sept. 28, 
2003); Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer 
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Jan. 27, 1967) 610 UNTS 205 (entered into 
force on Oct. 10, 1967);  Antarctic Treaty (Dec. 1, 1959) 402 UNTS 71 (entered into force on June 23, 
1961). 
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of any one state.”32   In the absence of sanctions for an unreasonable use of 
the “common property,” however, it may be difficult to control overuse.33  
Two peculiar characteristics distinguish commons resources from 
PGRs.   Commons resources are public goods, excluding outsiders from 
using them is difficult and very costly.  Public goods possess the character-
istic of non-excludability.  This characteristic of non-excludability makes 
commons resources susceptible to over-exploitation or abuse.  Resources 
of this nature only become exclusive property through capture or taking, 
but until then, they are held in common.  No identifiable state, user, or 
group may exercise exclusive control or ownership rights over commons 
resources similar to privately or communally owned property.   
Plant genetic properties or information (such as the traditional knowl-
edge on their  uses) do not fit the above description of “commons” for a 
number of reasons.  First, the resource (germplasm) is found in plants 
within the borders of a sovereign state.  Second, source countries are not 
capable of protecting germplasm exploitation from outsiders in the same 
way as a copyright owner of computer software can prevent its pirating by 
unauthorized persons or entities.  Both national and international laws are 
at the disposal of the software owner to enforce his property rights.  On the 
contrary, PGR source communities or states cannot employ a similar pro-
tection.  Third, the traditional knowledge on the uses and benefits of PGRs 
are not strictly in the public domain.  Such knowledge is freely accessible 
amongst source communities because of their communitarian rather than 
liberal way of life.  In other words, the practice buttresses their belief in 
communitarian relationship as opposed to the Western private ownership 
structure founded on the free market and the liberal economic model.  This 
fundamental difference should be taken into consideration in efforts to 
develop international trade regulations or global property ownership struc-
tures.   
Public goods also possess the characteristic of non-rivalry.  This means 
that the consumption or use of the property or resource by one person nei-
ther diminishes its availability nor extinguishes another’s right to access or 
use it.34   But this characteristic appears to no longer be tenable in view of 
Hardin’s seminal paper on the Tragedy of the Commons.35  Hardin con-
  
 32. Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29, at 141.  
 33. On a similar note, Hardin questioned whether such words as “responsibility” (which in this case 
is “non-reasonable use”) are not attempts to “browbeat a free man in a commons into acting against his 
own interest?”  For Hardin, “[r]esponsibility … is an attempt to get something for nothing.”   Garrett 
Hardin, Tragedy of the Commons 162 Science 1243, 1243 (Dec. 13, 1968). 
 34. See Alison Butler, Environmental Protection and Free Trade: Are they Mutually Exclusive 
(reprinted in Jeffrey A. Frieden & David A. Lake, International Political Economy: Perspectives on 
Global Power and Wealth 433, 436 (4th ed., Bedford/St. Martin’s 2000)). 
 35. Hardin, supra, n. 33. 
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tends that the problem with the commons is that access is not regulated.36  
Hardin asserts that non-regulated access results in overuse, and subse-
quently, to an end in the common resources.37  From Hardin’s analysis, 
both renewable and non-renewable resources are susceptible to overuse; 
however, assuming the non-rivalry characteristic of a public good is still 
valid despite Hardin’s postulations, what is the basis for equating PGRs 
with public good resources?   
This article argues the contrary largely because both the knowledge on 
the uses of PGRs and the genetic material itself are intertwined.  Loss of 
one invariably necessitates loss of the other.  After all, knowledge per se is 
non-rivalry yet scientific knowledge that leads to innovation is protected 
through IPRs for the sole benefit of the innovators or the corporation that 
funded the research.   Furthermore, by virtue of the significance and spiri-
tual attributes of most plants from which valuable PGRs are obtained, it is 
contended that for each genetic material removed from such crop or me-
dicinal plants, the property’s worth is grossly diminished.  This contention 
that the worth diminishes is premised on the fact that in germplasm, the 
value of the whole is in the part.   
Consequently, there is no legal, economic, or social basis for describ-
ing PGRs as the common heritage of mankind.  In fact, the concept of the 
common heritage of mankind originated without any reference to germ-
plasm.  Although there is no consensus on the origins of this concept in 
international law, a brief summary of how it got into international law lexi-
con is imperative at this stage.   
Arvid Pardo, the Maltese Ambassador to the United Nations during the 
1968 debates on ownership of the seabed is usually credited with the ori-
gins of the concept of common heritage of mankind.  Others attribute the 
concept’s origin to Aldo Cocca’s earlier statement in 1967 at the delibera-
tions on the peaceful uses of the outer space.  Nevertheless, it is clear that 
the concept in its present usage and form was unknown prior to 1967.   On 
this basis, Mgbeoji argues that the concept could therefore “not have gov-
erned transactions on plants prior to its debut.”38     
Just like Hardin is credited with the phrase, “tragedy of the com-
mons”39 it was Pardo who popularized the concept of the “common heri-
tage of mankind” at the debate on the exploitation and uses of the re-
  
 36. See id. at 1244 (stating “Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.”). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Mgbeoji-Patents and Plants, supra n. 9, at 239. 
 39. See generally Valuing the Earth: Economics, Ecology, Ethics 127-151 (Herman E. Daly & 
Kenneth N. Townsend eds., The MIT Press 1993).  
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sources of the seabed.40  The international community agreed with Pardo 
that certain resources outside the territorial jurisdiction of states, such as 
the ocean seabed should be utilized in such a way as to benefit both the 
technologically advanced countries and those not too advanced.  In other 
words, access to and exploitation of such resources should not be on the 
basis of the survival of the fittest, which is the hallmark of capitalism41 and 
trade liberalism.42  Rather, the concept endorsed “all states to share in the 
rewards, even if unable to participate in the actual process of extraction.”43    
Moreover, the concept of “common heritage” differs both in meaning 
and character from “open access property,” “common property resources,” 
and “communal ownership” or “communal resources.”  For instance, 
“communal resources” or “communal ownership” is noted for having an 
identifiable leader or management that oversees their uses.  This is not an 
attribute of “open access property,” “common property resources,” or re-
sources within the common heritage paradigm.  Notwithstanding this dif-
ference, the principle of benefit sharing is a characteristic that permeates 
communal ownership resources, shared natural resources, and common 
heritage resources.44   
Besides UNCLOS, there are other international agreements that es-
pouse and incorporate the common heritage concept.45  Under these inter-
national agreements, the common heritage principle “implies a common 
responsibility”46 consisting of common management through the mecha-
nism of international institutions, equitable sharing of benefits,47 and non-
  
 40. The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Dec. 10, 1982) 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm (accessed 
Feb. 25, 2004) [hereinafter UNCLOS III]. UNCLOS III orchestrated the debates on ownership of the 
seabed.  By virtue of Articles 136 and 137 of the 1982 UNCLOS, the resources of the deep seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction (the Area) have been pronounced the “common heritage of mankind” 
vested in mankind as a whole.    
 41. See Martin O’Connor, Introduction: Liberate, Accumulate–and Bust?, in Is Capitalism Sustain-
able?: Political Economy and the Politics of Ecology 1-19 (Martin O’Connor  ed., The Guilford Press, 
1994));  see also Wolfgang Sachs et al., Greening the North: A Post-Industrial Blueprint for Ecology 
and Equity (Zed Books 1998). 
 42. See generally Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing 
World-System (Cambridge U. Press, 1991). 
 43. Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29, at 143. 
 44. See Judge Shigeru Oda, NIEO, Law of the Sea and Common Heritage of Mankind: Some Com-
ments in Legal Aspects of the New International Economic Order 171-173 (Kamal Hossain ed., Francis 
Pinter 1980)). 
 45. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and the Other Celestial Bodies 
(Dec. 5, 1979); UNCLOS III, supra n. 40, at part IX; Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of 
States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Jan. 
27, 1967), 610 U.N.T.S. 205; The Antarctic Treaty (June 23, 1961), 40 U.N.T.S. 71. 
 46. Biodiversity and International Law: The Effectiveness of International Environmental Law, 86 
(Simon Bilderbeek, ed., IOS Press 1992) [hereinafter Biodiversity and International Law]. 
 47. See International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Preamble, art. 9, 
10 (Nov. 3, 2001) http://pgrc3.agr.gc.ca/itpgrfa/treaty-traite_e.html (accessed Feb. 25, 2004). On details 
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appropriation, amongst other things.48  This may be the basis of Stenson 
and Gray’s contention that the concept of “common heritage assumed by 
Pardo and his supporters was not one of free access or common property 
but of common benefit.”49   
In practice, it is difficult to make the subtle distinction between these 
two concepts, namely “common property” and “common heritage of man-
kind” notwithstanding that managing common property resources is harder 
than managing common heritage resources.  For common property re-
sources, there is no restriction on uses and therefore capacity to exploit is 
vital.50  In contrast, the concept of common heritage acknowledges the 
weaknesses of some of the “common” owners and therefore endorses the 
principle of benefit sharing.  Under this arrangement, it is irrelevant that 
any particular state lacks the capability to exploit the resources described 
as common heritage.  Furthermore, for this category of property there is an 
inbuilt responsibility to exploit the resources in a sustainable manner be-
cause common heritage resources are available for both the living and 
those yet unborn.  In contrast, common property resources are available for 
the living, albeit the most capable because of this thin line distinction be-
tween these resources that Birnie and Boyle warned: “The common prop-
erty doctrine is not to be confused with the more recent ‘common heritage’ 
concept, a specialized regime applied to certain mineral resources, nor with 
‘shared natural resources’, where, … rights are shared by a limited number 
of states.”51 
Under international law, common property resource is synonymous 
with “open access” regime.  Often, the cost of maintaining exclusive rights 
over this resource outweighs any benefits that may accrue from taking such 
a protective step; therefore, common property resources encourage free 
riders,52 those who have contributed nothing but benefit from the resources 
as much as those who have contributed.53   On the contrary, there is some 
form of access regulation for “common heritage resources.”  Without a 
  
of an international agreement on benefit sharing of gains from the uses of germplasm, the International 
Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture  (popularly dubbed the Global Seed 
Treaty) clearly aligns with the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in recognizing national 
sovereignty over plant genetic resources within state borders. The treaty does not regard PGRs as part 
of the commons rather as a property, albeit a resource, belonging to farmers, through the trust system of 
state sovereignty.     
 48. Biodiversity and International Law, supra n. 39, at 87. 
 49. Stenson & Gray, supra n. 4, at 137. 
 50. See Wolfgang Sachs, Planet Dialectics: Explorations in Environment and Development 87 (Zed 
Books 1999). 
 51. Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29 at 141. 
 52. Friedman & Lake, supra n. 30 at 436. 
 53. For a concise definition of free rider concept, see GameTheory.net, 
http://www.gametheory.net/Dictionary/FreeRider.html (accessed Feb. 25, 2004).  
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mechanism for policing exploitation, it may be difficult for all of the inter-
ested parties to share in any accruing benefit from exploitation.  Thus, the 
scope of the common heritage concept under international law is limited.  
As Birnie and Boyle noted: 
Although the term ‘common heritage’ is frequently used loosely 
by environmentalists to refer either to all the living and non-living 
resources of nature or to the global environment as an ecological 
entity, for legal purposes the term is currently confined to the nar-
row meaning attributed to it in two conventions, namely, the 1979 
Moon Treaty and the 1982 UNCLOS.  Though both apply the con-
cept to areas beyond national jurisdiction, they relate in this respect 
only to their non-living resources, to which in the latter treaty a 
precise and narrow definition is given.54 
In non-international law parlance, such as sociology and anthropology, 
common property resources have a different meaning from what we have 
described above.  Simply put, commons are areas or resources “co-owned 
and actively stewarded by a specific community.”55  Under these disci-
plines, “common property” is nearer in meaning to “communal property 
resources” than “open access resources.”  For sociologists and anthropolo-
gists, common property owners enjoy the benefits of a determinate man-
agement that is compensated for overseeing the common property.  With 
such management, there is no likelihood of overuse occurring.        
Consequently, Hardin’s commons would be interpreted differently in 
legal and non-legal disciplines.  For instance, common property in interna-
tional law signifies availability of a free resource susceptible to over-
exploitation.  There is no doubt that this is a resource to which Hardin’s 
Tragedy of the Commons applies.56  It is such resources’ character of “open 
access” that may have triggered Hardin’s concern.  In sociology and an-
thropology, however, Hardin’s tragedy of the commons would only apply 
to “open access” resources and not to “common property resources” be-
cause unlike the commons resources, the common property resources have 
identifiable owners and determinate management. 
In view of the foregoing, classifying PGRs or the traditional knowl-
edge on their uses as part of the commons would be inappropriate.  With 
adequate legal protection, both have the characteristics of excludability and 
  
 54. Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29, at 143 (emphasis added). 
 55. M. Patricia Marchak, Who Owns Natural Resources in the United States and Canada? 3 (Work-
ing Paper No. 20, N. Am. Series, Oct. 1998) http://www.wisc.edu/ltc/wp20.html (accessed Feb. 25, 
2004). 
 56. Cf. James M. Buchanan, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and Anticommons, 43 J. of L. & Econ. 
1-13 (U. of Chicago Press 2000). 
File: commons.final(macro)moyermaier Created on: 3/10/2004 2:45 PM Last Printed: 3/26/2004 10:33 AM 
2004 THE COMMONS CONCEPT 77 
rivalry, the hallmark of items capable of ownership, including patent pro-
tection.  The current classification of PGRs as items of common heritage of 
humankind is not only arbitrary but lacks justification within the sphere of 
available property jurisprudence.  For instance, the resources are found 
within the bounders of sovereign states.  Additionally, local conservation 
mechanisms of indigenous people and local farmers in source communities 
have been instrumental to the discovery of the utilitarian values of these 
resources.  Traditional knowledge on the value and uses of these resources 
is passed down from one generation to the other through oral tradition or 
other methods of record keeping that is unknown to Western science and 
epistemology.  Under the arrangement, PGR source communities enjoy not 
only communal ownership to these resources but also the indigenous 
knowledge on their uses.  This relationship is different from that described 
under international law with respect to common property or common heri-
tage.57  In the former, the communal relationship of traditional communi-
ties is imbued with identifiable resource leader or management.58   
Communal ownership of property is not an anathema.59  It appears, 
however, that biotechnology rich countries relish the current non-
propertization of PGRs or the traditional knowledge on their uses because, 
besides providing unfettered access to these valuable products and infor-
mation, the current practice weakens the principle of benefit sharing enun-
ciated in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).60  Unlike PGRs, 
open access resources are not “containable within national or regional 
boundaries.”61 There is, therefore, no legal basis for pigeonholing PGRs 
into the commons concept.    
Currently, only the CBD and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (Global Seed Treaty)62 are the fore-
most international instruments that ascribe proprietary character to PGRs.  
These two instruments acknowledge a source country’s sovereign owner-
  
 57. See The Rural Advancement Found. Intnl., Enclosures of the Mind: Intellectual Monopolies 26 
(1996). 
 58. Marchak, supra n. 55, at 3. 
 59. See J.W. Harris, Property and Justice 139-161 (Oxford U. Press 2001) (providing a detailed 
analysis of the term “property” and its various meaning depending on use and application). 
 60. Convention on Biological Diversity (Jun. 5, 1992), http://www.biodiv.org/doc/legal/cbd-en.pdf 
(accessed Feb. 25, 2004). 
 61. Marchak, supra n. 55, at 3. Consequently, Hardin could have talked of the “Tragedy of Open 
Access Resources” as against the “Tragedy of the Commons.”  For a criticism of Hardin’s error in this 
regard, see Pauline E. Peters, Embedded Systems and Rooted Models: The Grazing Lands of Botswana 
and the Commons Debate (reprinted in The Question of the Commons: The Culture and Ecology of 
Communal Resources 171-175 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., The U. of Ariz. Press 
1987)) [hereinafter Embedded Systems];  see also Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic 
View of the Tragedy of the Commons (reprinted in Embedded Systems, supra n. 61, at 311). 
 62. Although a binding agreement when it becomes operational, the Global Seed Treaty is yet to 
come into force. 
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ship of germplasm found within its territory in addition to an ownership 
interest in ex-situ germplasm kept in overseas gene banks.  Admittedly, the 
CBD and the Global Seed Treaty respectively focus on biodiversity and 
food security.  Nevertheless, both recognize the proprietary interests of 
source communities and states to their germplasm together with the tradi-
tional knowledge on their uses.  Despite the contents of these international 
instruments, the industrialized capitalist nations have conveniently, and 
without any juridical support, extended the commons concept to traditional 
knowledge of local farmers and indigenous peoples on the uses of their 
PGRs.  Kloppenburg identified the reason for this one-sided approach 
when he said: “[t]he ideology of common heritage and the norm of free 
exchange of plant germplasm have greatly benefited the advanced capital-
ist nations, which not only have the greatest need for and capacity to col-
lect exotic plant materials but also have a superior scientific capacity to use 
them.”63  
Although the principle of state sovereignty is no longer absolute,64 
nevertheless, it is still universally accepted as one of the attributes of state 
independence.  Consequently, under customary international law, states 
have permanent sovereignty over natural resources (both renewable and 
non-renewable) found within their border and continental shelf.65   But 
there are instances where states have a joint or shared ownership to natural 
resources.  For example, where natural resources do not fall exclusively in 
one territory there is an understanding for joint but exclusive control of 
such natural resources by the resource-sharing countries.  Even at that, 
shared natural resources still fall outside the purview of common property 
of all states66 because, as Birnie and Boyle stated, “[t]he essence of this 
concept is a limited form of community interest, usually involving a small 
group of states in geographical contiguity, who exercise shared rights over 
resources in question.”67 Consequently, states in this category also share 
any burden that may arise from their joint exploitation of shared re-
sources.68    
  
 63. Kloppenburg-First the Seed, supra n. 9, at 167. 
 64. With the proliferation of environment concerns worldwide, states are now required to be respon-
sible in exploiting the natural resources within their territories.  For a detailed discussion of this issue, 
see Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29, at 139.  
 65. See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, I.C.J. Rep. 116 (1951).  
 66. Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29, at 139. 
 67. Id. at 139. 
 68. See the UN General Assembly Resolution 3129 XXVIII (1973) on the adequate international 
standards for the conservation and utilization of natural resources held in common by two or more 
states; see also Article 3 of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, for a similar 
provision.  
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Ignorance or lack of the technology to exploit natural resources within 
a country’s territory is not reason to deny any country control of its re-
sources.  Upon discovery of natural resources, an entity (foreign or local) 
may apply for and be granted a license to exploit the resources subject to 
payment of a royalty or resource rent to the source state.  It does not matter 
if the resources are renewable or non-renewable.  Treating these resources 
differently from PGRs69 amounts to a forceful appropriation without any 
support in law; therefore, Aoki’s caution on the legitimacy or otherwise of 
cultural appropriation is germane: 
We need to be careful about constructing the public domain to 
avoid conceiving of the biological and cultural resources of the 
Third World as belonging to the “common heritage of humanity,” 
thereby effectively putting them up for grabs by entrepreneurs 
from the developed countries eager to turn such public domain 
items into private intellectual property.  There is a paradoxical 
need to simultaneously rein in the maximalist impulse in the intel-
lectual laws of the developed countries and to imagine ways to 
protect the cultural and biological resources of the developing and 
least developed countries.  In particular, there is a very serious 
question whether the category of “property,” or the historically 
contingent and individualistic notion of “property,” that has arisen 
in the West, is even appropriate when discussing things like agri-
cultural practices, cell lines, seed plasm, and oral narratives that 
“belong” to communities rather than individuals.  If we are not ca-
pable of acknowledging the existence of different life-worlds and 
ways of envisioning human beings’ relationship to the natural 
world in our intellectual property laws, then unfortunately, it may 
be late in the day for biodiversity and hopes for genuinely multi-
cultural world.70   
In addition, recent literature on ecology and environmental science 
now use the phrase “common concern” to refer to endangered species and 
issues on environmental degradation.71  Also, the Global Seed Treaty uses 
this phrase in preference to the phrase common heritage concept.72  The 
  
 69. Cf. Fowler, supra n. 20, at 230-231. 
 70. Keith Aoki, Nationalism, Anticommons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New 
World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection, 6 Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 11, 46 
(1998), http://www.law.uoregon.edu/faculty/kaoki/site/articles/notsobrave.pdf (accessed on Feb. 25, 
2004).  
 71. Birnie & Boyle, supra n. 29, at 608; see also Sachs, supra n. 50, at 173;  Vogler, supra n. 25, at 
2-19;  Fikret Berkes, ed., Common Property Resources: Ecology and Community-Based Sustainable 
Development (Belhaven Press, 1989);  Embedded Systems, supra n. 61. 
 72. See Global Seed Treaty, supra n. 47, at third preamble. 
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idea behind the phrase, “common concern” is that although a resource may 
fall within a state’s territorial jurisdiction, nevertheless its exploitation may 
be of “common concern” to other countries because of its habitat, biologi-
cal, natural, economic and/or social values to the world community, or in 
view of its potential environmental hazard.73  Unlike the concept of com-
mon heritage, however, the phrase, “common concern” does not remove 
ownership and control from source communities.  
Based on the foregoing, the concept of free and fair trade orchestrated 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) is tainted with inequity.  The 
WTO, as an institution, is currently devoid of a level playing field for all of 
its members.  This makes it an unattractive institution because it is incapa-
ble of carrying out the duties outlined in its creating treaty in an unbiased 
manner.  For their part, non-governmental biotechnology organizations, in 
partnership with PGR source states or communities, have continued to 
pressure biotechnology rich countries through lobbying, organized demon-
strations, and petitions.74    
III. EXTENSION OF THE ‘COMMONS’ CONCEPT TO PGRS 
Most economists argue that the non-propertization of germplasm has 
no effect on traditional farmers and source communities.75  As earlier 
stated, they contend that taking a few cell lines from local plants does not 
diminish the subsequent uses of such plants by local farmers or communi-
ties.  It is also their opinion that patent protection on the resulting processes 
or products only excludes the appropriation or uses of the elite products 
without the consent of the patent holder.  A similar protection is not avail-
able for the local cultivars as the right of local farmers and communities to 
their landraces is not exclusive and mostly remains encumbered.  This di-
chotomy between the treatment of landraces and elite crops is typical of 
capitalist ideology.  This is rooted in the perceived inequality of cultures, 
which the IPR regime has exacerbated.  Wallerstein described this devel-
  
 73. See David A. Andow, Simon A. Levin, & Mark A. Harwell, Evaluating Environmental Risks 
from Biotechnology: Contributions of Ecology in Application of Biotechnology: Environmental and 
Policy Issues 125-144 (John R. Fowle III, ed., Westview Press, 1987). 
 74. See e.g. Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration of November 14, 2001, ¶ 19  
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.htm (accessed Feb. 25, 2004)  
(perceived as one of the efforts by these groups to ensure that PGRs, biodiversity, traditional knowl-
edge and folklore are protected and rewarded appropriately).    
 75. See William Kingston, Innovation, Creativity and the Law 107-134 (Kluwer Academic 1990);  
Biotechnology Revolution, supra n. 13, at 25-26.  
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opment as the capitalist approach to creating and maintaining “legal mo-
nopolies and/or other forms of constraint of trade.”76   
Some economists also contend that because of the nature of PGRs and 
the traditional knowledge of their uses, it is difficult to exclude third par-
ties from freely accessing them.  Their argument is based on the fact that 
several people in the community already have access to these resources.  
They also contend that traditional knowledge of the uses of PGRs belong 
to the public domain and therefore require no protection.77  These are some 
of the reasons why communal property rights over PGRs or the traditional 
knowledge of their uses have been rejected in the Western property para-
digm.78   
The above arguments ignore the holistic nature of communal property 
ownership over resources.  As already noted, communally owned resources 
have an identifiable management structure that oversees the resources for 
the benefit of the communal owners. It is this attribute that distinguishes 
these resources from other resource ownership structures, such as “com-
mon heritage” or “open access” resources.  Similarly, the contention that 
the appropriation of a portion or single cells from germplasm does not di-
minish the entire PGRs stock begs the issue at stake.  This is because the 
peculiar nature of germplasm means that the value of the whole is in the 
part.79    
Source countries or communities are unable to enforce their right of 
excludability over PGRs against third parties mainly due to the current 
international institutions that undermine their communal property rights.  
Based on recent developments and awareness, there is a consensus that 
traditional societies have past, present, and future input in the enrichment 
of PGRs and their conservation.80  What is absent is adequate compensa-
tion, which would flow back to them from the users of such germplasm 
and knowledge.  Perhaps the recent Global Seed Treaty will be able to re-
dress the present unjust and asymmetrical arrangement when it comes into 
  
 76. Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World-Economy 149 (Cambridge U. Press 1979). 
 77. See generally Patrick Cohendet & Pierre-Benoit Joly, The Protection of Technological Knowl-
edge: New Issues in a Learning Economy in The Globalizing of the Learning Economy 65, 65 (Daniel 
Achibugi & Bengt-Ake Lundvall, eds., Oxford University Press, 2001); Aoki, supra n. 70, at 43-45; cf. 
Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge, 33 Case W. Res. J. Intl L. 233, 
254-255 (2001); Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy: The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge (Between the Lines 
1997). 
 78. See Iain J. Davidson-Hunt, The State, the Village and the Commoner in the Western Himalaya in 
Sustainability of Mountain Environments in India and Canada 187, 188 (Fikret Berkes & James S. 
Gardner eds., U. of Manitoba 1997). 
 79. See e.g. Meenakshi Ganguly, Descendants of “God's Physician” Share Their Secrets, Time 
International (Nov. 9, 1998) 38 (The article chronicles how the Kani tribe in India is receiving royalties 
from the sale of an anti-fatigue herbal preparation, formerly unknown to non-Kani indigenes). 
 80. See Shiva, supra n. 77, at 69-72. 
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force. In fashioning a mechanism for calculating the quantum of such 
compensation, Sedjo made germane comments:    
Biological and genetic resources, including plant germplasm, 
clearly have economic value.  Germplasm, the substance in the 
plant cells by which hereditary characteristics are transmitted, is 
the fundamental material of life.  The stock of genetic resources 
comprises a vast reservoir of heritable characteristics that have ac-
tual and potential use.  The characteristics have potential use in 
development of improved crops, pharmaceuticals, and other natu-
ral products as well as plant species capable of restoring depleted 
soils.81  
It appears that the concept of common heritage of humankind is con-
trary to the principle of sovereignty and territorial integrity.82   By virtue of 
the principle of state sovereignty in international law, states are entrusted 
with natural resources within their borders.  This is still the position.  Since 
germplasm is found in plants located within the territory of states it cannot 
qualify as an open access resource.  Mgbeoji’s analysis on this issue is apt:  
[I]t is thus apparent that the notion of common heritage of man-
kind is the very opposite of principles of international law govern-
ing access to, control or dominion over assets or properties which 
fall within the jurisdiction of a recognized state.  In effect, sover-
eignty and jurisdiction over a territory is an indefeasible aspect and 
character of statehood and whatever falls within the boundaries of 
a state is subject to the amplitude and magnitude of state jurisdic-
tion.83   
Unlike Kloppenburg84 and Mgbeoji,85 other commentators, such as 
Stenson and Gray, contend that the principle of state sovereignty is not 
antithetical to the common heritage concept.86  For this group, the only 
way inconsistency may arise is by classifying all germplasm (both land-
races and elite seeds) as common heritage of mankind.87  It is also their 
view that if the concept is seen in its fullest sense “of common benefit, 
  
 81. Roger A. Sedjo, Property Rights and the Protection of Plant Genetic Resources, in Seeds and 
Sovereignty: The Use and Control of Plant Genetic Resources 293, 295 (Jack R. Kloppenburg  ed., 
Duke U. Press 1988). 
 82. Id. at 295. 
 83. Mgbeoji-Patents and Plants, supra n. 9, at 240. 
 84. Sedjo, supra n. 81, at 295. 
 85. Mgbeoji-Patents and Plants, supra n. 9, at 240. 
 86. Stenson & Gray, supra n. 4, at 137. 
 87. As incorporated in the 1983 Food  and Agric. Org. of the U. N. International Undertaking on 
Plant Genetic Resources. 
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then national sovereignty and common heritage are by no means incom-
patible.”88   
The above position is contestable in view of the available jurispru-
dence on resource ownership and control.  First, Stenson and Gray, and 
those sympathetic to their opinion, fail to acknowledge the-all-time princi-
ple of a country’s sovereignty over natural resources in its territory.  Sec-
ond, they are unable to demonstrate any justification for their position ex-
cept for the huge research and development costs invested in biotechnol-
ogy inventions.  But huge research and development costs are neither syn-
onymous with innovation nor one of the criteria for patent protection.  
Third, they provide no significant differences between the prior and ongo-
ing intellectual contributions of local farmers and indigenous communities 
to landraces, and the work of laboratory scientists with respect to elite cul-
tivars.  Without any such clear distinctions there are no justifiable basis to 
ascribe the common heritage concept only to landraces.  It is even inequi-
table when these landraces are the bedrock of the elite crops or most labo-
ratory-processed medicines.   
Most patented drugs were developed from the cells of local plants after 
corporations obtained relevant local information or traditional knowledge 
of the uses of these plant resources.89  For instance, it was on this basis, in 
addition to proof of the existence of prior knowledge on the medicinal 
properties and uses of neem tree in India, that the European Patent Office, 
Munich revoked90 the patent91 granted in 1994 to W.R. Grace, a United 
States firm.  This patent had protected the use of Indian neem tree 
(Azadirachta indica) oil as an antifungal agent.92  In cases like this, tradi-
tional societies should at least be entitled to compensation for uses emanat-
ing from their PGRs or the traditional knowledge of them. To achieve this 
will involve long-term acceptance of the inherent communal property own-
ing system. 
Therefore, notwithstanding the trial and error mechanism of Western 
science in pharmaceuticals and agricultural biotechnology, raw materials 
used for such experiments belong to a particular locality, for which com-
pensation is appropriate.93  Until this happens, Fowler and Mooney will 
  
 88. Stenson & Gray, supra n. 4, at 151. 
 89. Shiva, supra n. 77, at 69-72. 
 90. Effective May 10, 2000. 
 91. European Patent No. 436,257.  
 92. See Anonymous, Neem Tree Free, 30 The Ecologist 8 (June 2000);  Anonymous, European 
Patent Office Rejects Neem Tree Patent, Synthesis/Regeneration 48 (2000).  
 93. See Janet McGowan & Iroka Udeinya, Collecting Traditional Medicines in Nigeria: A Proposal 
for IPR Compensation, in Intellectual Property Rights for Indigenous Peoples: A Sourcebook 57-68 
(Tom Greaves, ed., Socy. for Applied Anthropology 1994) (for suggestions on a model contract for 
compensating indigenous communities for uses of their PGRs). 
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remain correct that the controversies surrounding the control of PGRs and 
their consequential description as part of the commons is “biopolitics.”  
According to them: 
[F]rom the earliest times, ownership and control of plants and their 
diversity have been much more than merely scientific or technical 
concerns.  They have been and will continue to be profoundly po-
litical.  The strength of nations has risen and fallen; great fortunes 
have been made and lost; and people have enjoyed plenty or suf-
fered hunger at best in part because of, who owned, controlled, 
used, and benefited from genetic diversity, and who did not.94 
IV. PGRS AND THE POLITICS OF NON-PROPERTIZATION  
It is doubtful that the denial of proprietary rights and the incapacity of 
the market to deal with PGRs are a result of any difficulty in apportioning 
monetary value to germplasm.  As previously argued, PGRs do not have 
the unique attributes of the commons.95  The incessant demand for PGRs 
by multinational seed and pharmaceutical corporations is an indication of 
their inherent economic, social, and medicinal values.  Moreover, biodiver-
sity and PGRs conservation are perceived worldwide as a means of solving 
the world’s food and agriculture problems.  In addition, the value and po-
tential of PGRs as a source of modern medicinal discoveries cannot be 
overemphasized.96  But if germplasm is inferior to elite plants, then why is 
the international community interested in biodiversity?  Furthermore, if 
PGRs do not have economic value why were some European countries, 
particularly the Dutch and French, so protective of their germplasm during 
the colonial era?  Kloppenburg and Kleinman assert that these countries 
went “to a great lengths to prevent their competitors from obtaining useful 
plant genetic materials.”97 
  
 94. Cary Fowler & Pat Mooney, Shattering: Food, Politics, and The Loss of Genetic Diversity 200 
(The U.of Ariz. Press, 1990).  
 95. The “commons” characteristics include free availability without restriction; one person’s use 
does not diminish what is available to others; and cost of preventing third party use, preserving it or 
providing it, is exorbitant. 
 96. As Sedjo rightly noted: “[W]hile today germplasm from many organisms is considered to be of 
no economic importance, some of it may eventually become useful in genetic engineering.  Hence, 
species that have no current commercial application or are as yet undiscovered nevertheless have value 
as a repository of genetic information that someday may have direct commercial and/or social value.”  
See Sedjo, supra n. 81, at 296. 
 97. Jack Kloppenburg & Daniel Lee Kleinman, Plant Genetic Resources: The Common Bowl, in 
Seeds and Sovereignty: The Use and Control of Plant Genetic Resources 1, 5 (Jack R. Kloppenburg  
ed., Duke U. Press 1988).  
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It has also been argued that even if PGRs are propertized, the tradi-
tional knowledge of their uses was not the discovery of one person, but that 
of a whole community and of generations too numerous to acknowledge or 
compensate.98 Indigenous knowledge of germplasm is communally experi-
enced and shared, however, this does not make it any different from share-
holders who have stakes in companies and are paid dividends.99  It is also 
no different from scientists in various disciplines or universities who col-
laborate in research for mutual benefit.  Such collaboration is made without 
sacrificing researchers’ independence.100  Unlike the commons resource, 
there is an identifiable management responsible for coordinating the inter-
ests of the communal owners of the resources.  Therefore, the refusal to 
extend exclusive proprietary rights to PGRs based on the pretext of an in-
ability to isolate individual ownership is not fortuitous, but a calculated 
means of exploitation by the West.  After all, the “common knowledge” of 
laboratory innovators is not a basis for the denial of patent protection to 
laboratory-driven inventions.   
While purportedly difficult to delineate the specific individual proprie-
tary owners of PGRs, it should be noted that patent protection is no longer 
strictly a reward to individual inventors.  Indeed, “the contemporary reality 
is that since the legal fiction of an employer’s ownership in the employee’s 
invention, and the economies-of-scale of group research, a community of 
scientists working away in huge laboratory complexes has driven the con-
cept of the solitary inventor to virtual extinction.”101  It is therefore inequi-
table to use the communal or collective nature of the development and im-
provement of PGRs in traditional societies as one of the basis for non-
extension of patent protection to germplasm.102  At no occasion in the his-
tory of patents has the choice to exchange ideas been a precursor for non-
patentability of innovation.  The free exchange of knowledge by and 
  
 98. Depending on who is making the argument, the entitlement theory has been used to support and 
to oppose compensating local farmers for their input on PGRs.  See e.g. Stenson & Gray, supra n. 4, at 
89-91; Peter Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth, 1996).  
 99. See Bernard Bonnet, Shared Management of Common Resources: Strengthening Local Skills, 
http://www.iied.org/docs/drylands/dry_ip94eng.pdf (accessed Fed. 25, 2004) (for a detailed analysis of 
shared common resources in traditional communities).   
 100. Mgbeoji was very persuasive when he said that arguments to the contrary are fallacious.  As he 
noted, “[T]he villages or local communities of the indigenous and local peoples engaged in innovations 
of biological diversity may be likened to a huge laboratory complex in a developed nation.  Information 
on innovations, valuable discoveries and applicable technology are generally discussed and passed 
around informally by people in both systems.”  Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and Traditional Knowledge of 
the Uses of Plants: Is a Communal Patent Regime Part of the Solution to the Scourge of Bio Piracy?, 9 
Ind. J. Global Leg. Stud. 163-186 (2001).  
 101. Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and Plant Resources-Related Knowledge: Towards a Regime of Com-
munal Patents for Plant Resources-Related Knowledge, in Environmental Law in Developing Coun-
tries 81, 103 (Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin ed., IUCN 2001) [hereinafter Mgbeoji-PPR]. 
 102. Id. (for a detailed argument on this point). 
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amongst traditional communities should not ipso facto confine traditional 
ideas in PGRs to public domain.103  Similarly, rejecting the proprietary 
nature of such knowledge on the basis of non-documentation is testimony 
to the difficulty of the West to accept diversity in its real sense.  After all, 
writing is unknown to many traditional societies.  Therefore, as Posey and 
Dutfield stated, “any legal instruments aimed at protecting cultural knowl-
edge must accommodate cultural and local variation in the forms of such 
systems.”104  
Notwithstanding the entity with the proprietary interest in PGRs,105 ab-
rogating the concept of common heritage will ensure that these resources 
are only utilized with the owner’s consent.  Invoking Article 27(3) of the 
TRIPs Agreement by attaching an “effective” sui generis type of proprie-
tary right to PGRs is a tempting alternative.  Under this arrangement, coun-
tries will be at liberty to set their own intellectual property regime for 
PGRs.  As magnanimous as this provision appears, it lacks any specificity 
particularly with respect to the meaning of either “effective” or “sui 
generis” as they are not defined in the TRIPs Agreement.  Moreover, there 
is no guarantee that whatever is adopted as sui generis would be acceptable 
to other countries, particularly in the West.  Of particular interest is the fact 
that the United States and other Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries clearly favor a sui generis regime that 
complies with the provisions of UPOV convention.  This is because these 
countries insist that PGRs do not meet the criteria for IPRs protection.  
Chambers and Bertram provide a background for the United States’ posi-
tion that PGRs are part of the commons.106  They suggest that the United 
States perceives free accessibility, in situ and ex situ, as the key to benefit 
sharing of biotechnology gains by all the stakeholders, particularly devel-
oping countries.107  
Notwithstanding the above position, there is a subtle consensus that 
compensating developing countries for the use of their genetic resources 
could act as incentive for further conservation of biodiversity required for 
biotechnological inventions and research.  But there is no agreement yet on 
either the items for which compensation is due or the modalities for deter-
mining the compensation.  Attaching economic value to PGRs and also 
acknowledging the proprietary rights of source communities to PGRs and 
  
 103. See generally Dutfield, supra n. 77, at 237-238. 
 104. Posey & Dutfield, supra n. 28, at 60. 
 105. Whether nation states, communities or individuals. 
 106. See Judith Chambers & Robert Bertram, The U.S. Position on the Consultative Group on Inter-
national Agricultural Research, in Intellectual Property Rights III Global Genetic Resources: Access 
and Property Rights 59, 73-75 (Steve A. Eberhart, et al. eds., Crop Sci. Socy. Am. 1998).  
 107. Id. at 62. 
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traditional knowledge thereof may be a viable alternative.  These and other 
options should be extensively considered at the ongoing multilateral trade 
negotiations orchestrated by the 2001 Doha WTO Ministerial Declaration.  
The benefit sharing provision in the CBD and the Global Seed Treaty pro-
vide good basis for negotiation on this issue, but requires the buy-in of 
industrialized countries through their ratification of these conventions.108  
As such, the current multilateral trade negotiation provides developing 
countries an opportunity to lobby for changes on the status of genetic re-
sources.  The World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and other 
expert institutions have done extensive work on traditional knowledge and 
folklore.  For instance, the WIPO report on traditional knowledge supports 
changes that involve propertization of PGRs.109 According to Wilder: 
The work that WIPO has done in the field of traditional knowl-
edge, which is also informed by years of development for co-
operation experience, leads me to believe that the anxieties identi-
fied above cannot simply and quickly be allayed.  Further, while 
the source of the anxiety may be global –the TRIPs Agreement for 
example –but the solutions depend on an inclusive, scientific, rig-
orous, and very local approach…110 
On another note, the usual agreement between gene banks and bio-
technology companies or private research institutions should also be har-
monized in content and use.  The agreement should comply with the provi-
sions of the CBD and the Global Seed Treaty by specifying clearly that the 
consent of source countries is required before any material (ex-situ PGRs) 
obtained from such centers for research can be patented.111  Although the 
ongoing round of trade negotiations is dubbed the “development round,”112 
it can only be so in reality if biotechnology countries endorse changes in 
the ownership status of raw PGRs.  The change must be capable of vesting 
PGRs with a proprietary interest even of a different character.  The credit-
  
 108. The United States has reiterated that it will not be a party to any convention that undermines the 
TRIPs Agreement.  In some ways, the CBD and the Global Seed Treaty resemble such a convention.  
 109. See Richard Wilder, Global Harmonization of Intellectual Property, in Foundations and Per-
spectives of International Trade Law 516, 528-530 (Ian Fletcher, Loukas Mistelis & Marice Cremona, 
eds., Sweet & Maxwell 2001).    
 110. Id. at 530 (outlining the three elements that a collaborative and inclusive solution must contain).  
 111. See Susan H. Bragdon, Recent Intellectual Property Rights Controversies and Issues at the 
CGIAR, in. Santaniello et al., supra n. 18, at 77, 81-82. 
 112. This terminology was developed prior to the 1999 Seattle WTO meeting. Due to the disruption 
of the meeting by activists, however, the first “development round” never came to be; therefore, it is a 
carry over term.  The term represents or refers to a trade round in which developing countries are 
expected to gain some concessions on their demands, particularly on the reclassification of germplasm 
for patent purposes.    
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ability of the WTO,113 however, will be challenged and maybe undermined 
if the concerns of developing countries are not fully addressed in this 
round.114   
In the interim, the extension of the commons concept to local cultivars, 
while shielding elite plants from such description, may be attributed to the 
strong United States’ hegemonic control over the international institutions 
overseeing germplasm collection.  Both the United States, and other OECD 
countries jealously protect their seed companies.  In the process, these 
countries ignore the beauty of the modern world, its diversity.  The princi-
ple of diversity is that no system should be ignored or denigrated.  At the 
same time, no system should be seen as superior to others. Rather a system 
of mutual respect and tolerance should be encouraged.  Unfortunately, is-
sues on the control of germplasm have not been treated in this manner.   
None of the current institutions appear to satisfy the whole parties –North 
and South inclusive.  As already noted, however, paragraph nineteen of the 
November 2001 Doha (WTO) Ministerial Declaration may be a magic 
wand for redressing the current asymmetrical benefit from germplasm.  
This is in view of the mandate to the council responsible for reviewing the 
TRIPs Agreement in order to re-examine the possibility of harmonizing 
TRIPs and CBD.  Whether the WTO is the proper forum to achieve this 
equality of treatment of resources is not the focus of this article.  Suffice to 
say that the power imbalance in international institutions may be a hin-
drance for an impartial mediation of this controversy through the WTO.  
After all, the WTO is not immune from the politics of germplasm.  The 
future is uncertain in this regard and like Polanyi, “I am primarily con-
cerned in this note with the effect of current scientific principles on our 
culture at large, where the disregard of truth in favor of hard-boiled scien-
tific ideas has spread confusion and led eventually to sinister results.”115 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to discuss, from an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive, the origins and meaning of the commons in relation to PGRs.  It also 
analyzes the different ideological debates on the status of PGRs in connec-
tion with IPRs protection.  It appears that both developing countries and 
  
 113. See e.g. The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance  (Gary P. Simpson 
ed., U.N. U. Press, 2001). 
 114. See Sylvia Ostry, The Post-Cold War Trading System: Who’s on First? (U. of Chicago Press, 
1997).   
 115. Michael Polanyi, Knowing and Being: Essays by Michael Polanyi 43 (Marjorie Grene ed., U. 
Chicago Press, 1969). 
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rich biotechnology countries have continuously played the “commons” 
card whenever it has suited their interests.  The West, however, has been 
the most successful in these circumstances.  Furthermore, in the struggle 
for the control of PGRs, the West has done little to acknowledge or com-
pensate the source countries for their valuable germplasm freely obtained 
for biotechnology research. 
In explaining this injustice,116 Marchak asserts that property rights are 
social institutions that “exist as long as the society is willing to enforce 
them.”117   What ends up being enforced, however, are the wishes of the 
most powerful nations.118  This is because international affairs and the 
promotion of economic interests of nations are based on lobbying and ne-
gotiations, which often are not democratic and equitable.  Thus, in multi-
lateral or bilateral negotiations, powerful states dangle promises of aid 
(economic or military) or the threat of sanctions in a carrot and stick ap-
proach to achieve their goals.119  
The question of the “commons” with respect to plant genetic resources 
is not different.  Hence, one can conclude that social institutions, such as 
the one on property rights, last as long as powerful states are willing to 
sustain it.  Moreover, as Harris noted, “intellectual property was created 
historically always in societies in which advanced property institutions 
over tangible resources were entrenched, and, to varying degrees, absorbed 
the existing mental frameworks of those institutions.”120  Although changes 
may occur, it may take a long period of time.121  This is the fate of develop-
ing countries in relation to control and propertization of PGRs for IPRs 
purposes.  Consequently, the politics of germplasm control vindicates Po-
lanyi that “[r]ightness is no longer achieved then by the triumph of utility 
over prejudice, but by the triumph of one class over another …”122 Simi-
larly, as Drahos contends, “[t]he dramatic expansion of intellectual prop-
  
 116. Wallestein was clear that “world inequality is a phenomenon about which most men and most 
groups are quite conscious.”  Immanuel Wallestein, The Capitalist World Economy 49 (Cambridge U. 
Press 1979).  
 117. See Marchak, supra n. 55, at 1. 
 118. See Susan Strange, States and Markets (2d ed. Pinter, 1994); Robert Gilpin & Jean M. Gilpin, 
The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton U. Press, 1987). 
 119. As Knorr argued, “[I]t will be readily agreed that any threat to cut off economic aid, unless 
certain conditions are met, is coercive, and so is any termination of aid accompanied by statements that 
its resumption depends on the recipient’s behaviour in certain respects.”  Klaus Knorr, Power and 
Wealth: The Political Economy of International Power 169 (Basic Books, 1973).  
 120. Harris, supra n. 59, at 47. 
 121. Marchak lists seven ways by which changes may occur to redefine an existing property regime. 
They are changes in “market conditions, popular sentiments, scientific knowledge, new technologies, 
lobbying, or legal battles.” Marchak, supra n. 55, at 10.   
 122. Polanyi, supra n. 115, at 43. 
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erty regimes, both nationally and internationally, in recent decades is in 
Marx’s terms an important superstructural transformation.”123   
Therefore, notwithstanding how the current round of multilateral trade 
negotiation progresses or turns out, the fact that developing countries have 
been provided opportunity to bargain on the future status of traditional 
knowledge (PGRs) in relation to IPRs is a welcome development.124  We 
hope they do not come out worse than they were initially.  
 
  
 123. Drahos, supra n. 98, at 99. 
 124. See Young, supra n. 14 (for a discussion of intellectual property on traditional knowledge).  
